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SOME COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Wendell Berge
The proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure present a
matter of immense importance to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice. Certainly the many facets of the subject
offer worthy challenges to the best intelligence of our profession.
I present here only certain personal views based on my own experience and that of members of my staff.
Why do we need to revise federal criminal procedure by adoption of a set of court rules? This question can be answered by considering, first, the need for a revision of existing procedure and the
adoption of a uniform system, and, second, the advantage of rulemaking through the promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court
in preference to other possible methods.
The need for uniform rules. On numerous questions the practice of various districts and circuits is in conflict. Existing legislation is fragmentary, and has not been periodically revised in any
systematic way to conform to experience. As late as the last term
the Supreme Court was presented with questions concerning procedural problems relating to such basic matters as representation
by counsel, Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279; detention and interrogation of suspects, McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350; and
the power of courts to correct errors without reference to lapse of
time, Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257. All these circumstances
suggest the timeliness of an overall reconsideration of our procedure and the adoption of a set of uniform rules.
Advantages of rlde-making by court promulgation of a set of
rules of general application. The highly technical and specialized
nature of the problems involved hardly recommends the ordinary
processes of legislation as a means of rule revision. The judicial
process as exercised in particular cases, on the other hand, is necessarily limited to dealing with specific situations as they chance to
arise. In many instances, as in the McNabb and Anderson cases,
judicial declaration of a rule in a particular case has the disadvantage of retroactive effect, with unfortunate consequences to cases
already pending in courts where law enforcement officers acted in
good faith and according to processes which they believed to be
legal. The method of judicial promulgation of rules of general application, prospective in operation, is free from these shortcomings.
Many of these rules restate existing law, giving it definitive
statement and bringing it together in one place. Some of the rules
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present procedural changes. How is the product to be judged? It
is suggested that we consider these rules from the standpoint of
three basic objectives: (1) The development of more scientific
processes for the objective ascertainment of facts; (2) Functional
improvement in procedure designed to reduce waste effort, delay
and expense in the administration of criminal law; and (3) Improvement in the administration of criminal law as an instrumentality for protecting the dignity and importance of the individual
in our democratic system of government.
L Rules Designed to Develop More Scientific Processes for the
Objective Ascertainment of Facts
The provision in Rule 18 that depositions may be taken at the
instance of the government will often permit the discharge of necessary witnesses committed under 28 U.S.C., Sections 657 or 659,
because of inability to give bond. While the use of depositions by
the government will necessarily be limited the rule should also be
useful in various cases where a government witness is likely to be
unavailable at the trial.
Rule 26 providing for the calling of expert witnesses by the
court, as well as by the parties should enable the court to correct
many current abuses and insure less partisan expert testimony.
Rule 30, among other things, increases the use of the presentence investigation. Under present law, the probation officer investigates cases only when they are referred to him. Under the
proposed rule, there will be a pre-sentence investigation in all
cases in which the court does not affirmatively order otherwise.
Another group of the rules would promote the more objective
ascertainment of facts by eliminating or reducing the role of surprise in criminal proceedings. Thus, under Rule 11 provision is
made that upon request a defendant shall be entitled to a copy of
the indictment or information without fees or costs. Rule 17 provides for advance notice of alibi by the defendant, a practice already adopted in fourteen states. The proposed rule provides that
the prosecution shall take the first step by requesting notice from
the defendant if he intends to offer alibi evidence. For otherwise
defendants or their counsel might sometimes be ignorant of their
burden in this regard and thereby lose, through failure to give
notice, their right to introduce alibi evidence.
Rule 19 would authorize the court to order the attorney for
the government to permit inspection before trial by the defense of
books, papers, documents, or tangible objects. There is some
precedent in federal practice for the pre-trial disclosure sanctioned
by Rule 19. But the instances have been relatively few. A strong
case for disclosure can be made out where the matter sought is an
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object which is itself evidence and to be used as a basis for expert
testimony. Questioned documents, fingerprint and ballistics exhibits, and the like would fall into this category. Beyond this we
move into less well charted ground. Should the defendant ever be
permitted to inspect statements of witnesses before trial? Should
he be permitted to inspect the statement or confession of a codefendant? Should he ever be permitted to inspect the minutes of
a grand jury, or the transcript of an administrative investigatory
hearing? The rule requires a showing that items sought are not
privileged and are material to the preparation of the defense. This
may be broad enough to include items which would not be ddmissible evidence at the trial Should not disclosure be limited to material evidence? A more definite indication of policy in the rule, or
at least in the note, would be helpful
I think that in time -we could well afford to travel considerably
further toward eliminating the element of surprise. For example,
there is a considerable variety of defenses available under the relatively non-committal plea of "not guilty." Should we not move in
the direction of more affirmative pleading? The alibi notice provision is a step in that direction, but is the hazard of surprise any
less with reference to other defenses?
Another respect in which the proposed rules seek to improve
the machinery for objective ascertainment of facts is reflected in
the many provisions assuring an adequate presentation of the defendant's case. Thus the rules seek to safeguard the defendant's
right to counsel (Rule 39 and related provisions); and to reduce
the often prohibitive burden of printing the record on appeal (Rule
37). Other provisions designed to assist the defendant who is
without the means or knowledge adequately to present his case
are found in Rule 6(a), where it is provided that the commissioner
shall inform the defendant fully of his rights; Rule 6(b), where
it is provided that the defendant shall not be called upon to plead
at the preliminary examination; -Rule 14, which provides relief
from prejudicial joinder; Rule 35(a) (2), safeguarding the defendant's right of appeal; and Rule 40(c) (2), enlarging the
grounds for change of venue to avoid prejudice.
Functional Improvements in Procedure Designed to Reduce
Waste Effort, Delay and Expense in the
Administration of Criminal Law.
Various provisions are designed to simplify procedure. The
abolition by Rule 13 of demurrers, motions to quash, pleas in abatement and pleas in bar, in favor of a simple motion to dismiss, is
a reform which should have been inaugurated a long time ago.
I cannot urge too strongly the importance and advantage of
II.
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the provision in Rule 8 permitting waiver of indictment in noncapital felony cases. Persons unable to furnish bail are often held
in jail for many months pending submission of a case to a grand
jury. Most of these persons would be glad to waive indictment in
order to get an immediate trial. Under present practice the government is put to a great deal of expense in maintaining these
persons during the months they are jailed prior to indictment, and
they, of course, lose precious time which, even if they are guilty,
does not count on their sentence.
Another important aspect of Rule 8 is the provision (subdivision (d) ) dealing with the nature and contents of indictments
and informations, and the accompanying sample forms. They are
simple, unadorned pleadings containing only the essential information necessary to notify the defendant of the charge against
him.
The provision for pre-trial conferences in Rule 16 provides a
means to simplify the issues, reduce the number of witnesses and
thus expedite the trial and save expense to both parties. Already
it has been employed to great advantage in many districts, and
particularly by Justice Laws in the District of Columbia. It should
be noted that participation in the conferences is not by direction of
the court as in civil procedure, but is voluntary upon invitation by
the court.
Another provision which may also be recommended as a sensible
improvement is found in Rule 40(c) (1), providing that a defendant who is arrested in a district other than that in which the
indictment or information is pending may, if he desires to plead
guilty or nolo contendere, waive his right to be tried in the district
where the offense occurred and consent to disposition of the case
in the district where he is arrested, subject to the approval of the
United States Attorney in each district. There would seem to be
no practical reason why a defendant should be required to travel
to the district where the indictment was returned in order to plead
and be sentenced.
Similar considerations commend the provisions of Rule 4 and
Rule 10, extending the territorial limits for execution of warrants
and service of summons. These provisions obviate the necessity for
removal proceedings from one district to another in the state, or
from one state to another within a radius of 100 miles of the place
where the warrant or summons is issued.
A few words should be said about some of the appeal rules.
Certainly the procedure is improved and simplified by Rules 35, 37
and 47. The abolition of petitions for allowance of appeal, citations
and assignments of error will obviate a lot of unnecessary and
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confusing paper work. The provision making exceptions unnecessary is, of course, sensible and should be adopted.
The provision eliminating the necessity of printing the record
on appeal in a separate volume also will provide a great saving in
time and money. The procedure provided in rule 37(b) (2) is
that of having each party print, as an appendix to his brief, such
portions of the record as the party desires the court to read. The
alternate suggestion in the supplement at page 25 would provide
that the appellant and the appellee shall in turn designate the portions of the record upon which they rely, which shall then be
printed in continuous form in a single volume. The choice should
be governed primarily by the convenience of the court. Either
provision is a vast improvement over the old practice of printing
the whole record even when only a minute portion is pertinent
to the issues on appeal.
III. Improvement in the Administration of Criminal Law as an
Instrzmentality for Protecting the Dignity and
Importance of the Individual. "
A judicial proceeding involves something more than adjudication of a particular case. It is also a public demonstration of a
conception of law and of a political system. Confidence in the integrity of judicial proceedings, and in the capacity of our system
to protect individual rights against arbitrary encroachment, is
thus a sine qua non of democracy.
The rules preserve existing procedural safeguards, public participation in the judicial process through the grand jury and the
petit jury, and in many other ways too numerous to mention punctiliously protect and strengthen the individual rights of defendants.
There will be much controversy about Rule 5, and particularly
subdivision (b), which provides that no statement made by a defendant in response to questioning by officers during any period
of illegal detention shall be admissible. The question is whether
the problem of eliminating abuses of the arresting process ought
to be dealt with through a rule of admissibility imposed in rules of
criminal procedure and, if so, whether the present rule does not
oversimplify the problem.
The McNabb and Anderson cases have initiated a general reconsideration of the whole question of interrogation of prisoners
by arresting officers. But many aspects of the problem remain to
be settled in subsequent cases or in specific legislation or court
rules. May persons in custody be questioned at all prior to arraignment where arraignment occurs as promptly as possible? Are
statements volunteered to police officers prior to arraignment admissible? To what extent may there be questioning by arresting
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officers where arrests are made on holidays or at times when committing magistrates are actually unavailable? Are there special
circumstances which may warrant or require that exceptions be
made to the rule of the McNabb and Anderson cases? Can the right
to immediate arraignment be waived by the person in custody?
There may be cases where a successful investigation is absolutely dependent upon immediate interrogation, or where a short
period of detention pending further investigation is necessary to
prevent the escape of confederates although evidence has not been
sufficiently developed to warrant making formal charges before a
commissioner. If exceptions are to be made, how are they to be
limited and what administrative and judicial safeguards can be
provided?
Perhaps, if sufficient time remains, the Committee could consider the possibility of formulating and defining limited classes
of situations in which detention and interrogation could be permitted under administrative or judicial safe-guards sufficient to
insure that civilized methods will be maintained and that the conditions and judgments with respect to detention shall not be left
to the uncontrolled discretion of the arresting officer. I realize that
this would be a difficult undertaking. It may be better to postpone
it until after we have tried to live under the McNabb and Anderson
decisions a year or two. Perhaps after we have had a little more
experience under the McNabb and Anderson rule we will be able
much better to chart a course for the future and some rules to
enforce it.
The rules do not deal with the qualifications or method of selection of jurors, but in his letter of transmittal, the Chairman of the
Advisory Committee states that the Committee has considered the
recent report of the Committee on Selection of Jurors, of which
Judge Knox is Chairman, and that the Committee favors the proposed legislation framed by Judge Knox's Committee to prescribe
uniform qualifications of jurors. The selection of jurors is one of
the most delicate problems in judicial administration. Without
many of the functional improvements embodied in the proposed
legislation relating to jury selection, the revision of criminal procedure proposed by the Advisory Committee would be incomplete.

